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This paper deals with an apparent contradiction between Kant’s account 
and solution of the mathematical antinomies of pure speculative reason in 
the Critique of Pure Reason and in the Prolegomena. In the fi rst Critique, 
Kant claims that the theses are affi rmative judgments, of the form ‘A is B’, 
and the antitheses are infi nite judgments, of the form ‘A is non-B’. The theses 
and the antitheses are contradictorily opposed (i.e., the one true and the other 
false) and their proofs are valid only if a certain condition takes places, 
that is, if the world has a determinate magnitude. Otherwise, both are false 
and their proofs are wrong. Given transcendental realism, this condition 
takes place and the mathematical antinomies arise. Given transcendental 
idealism, this condition does not take place, the theses and the antitheses 
are false, and the mathematical antinomies disappear. At a fi rst glance, 
according to the Prolegomena the theses are affi rmative judgments and 
the antitheses are not infi nite judgments, but negative judgments, of the 
form ‘A is not B’. Transcendental idealism granted, the subject common 
to theses and antitheses, namely, the concept of ‘world’, is inconsistent. 
Both judgments are false by the rule ‘non entis nulla sunt praedicata’ and 
the antinomies do not take place. These accounts seem to be incompatible 
with each other. Are the antitheses infi nite or negative judgments? Are the 
antinomies solved because the world does not have a determinate magnitude, 
or because its notion is inconsistent?
The paper argues that the contrast between the fi rst Critique and the 
Prolegomena is only apparent. It depends on an error in the most natural 
interpretation of the paragraphs on the mathematical antinomies in the 
Prolegomena. The text of the Prolegomena gives the reader the impression, 
but it does not explicitly claim, that the antitheses are negative judgments, 
rather than infi nite ones. In that case it is possible to hold that, for the 
Prolegomena, the antitheses are infi nite judgments, as they are for the 
Critique, and they are contradictorily opposed to each other only if the 
world has a determinate magnitude. In addition to what is explained in 
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the Critique, the Prolegomena make clear that both theses and antitheses 
have an inconsistent subject concept. On this reading, the Critique and 
the Prolegomena are not in contrast with each other. They rather complete 
each other, giving the reader a fuller comprehension of the solution of the 
mathematical antinomies. The theses and the antitheses are false because 
their subject is inconsistent, as the Prolegomena maintain. Their proofs 
are wrong because the world does not have a determinate magnitude, as 
the Critique claims.
Introduction1
The solution of the mathematical antinomies of pure speculative reason 
plays a central role for the whole Critical philosophy. It provides a way out 
of skepticism, it is the basis for the indirect proof of transcendental ideal-
ism, and it is indispensable in persuading man to accept the ‘Copernican 
revolution’ of Critical philosophy. From a systematical point of view, the 
treatment and solution of the antinomies in the fi rst Critique is a model for 
the solution of the antinomies which arise in moral philosophy, aesthetics 
and the study of living beings.
A crucial step toward the solution of the antinomies is the analysis of 
the relationship between theses and antitheses. As it is well-known, every 
antinomy is made up of two judgments which are opposed to each other, 
but proven by seemingly valid arguments and, therefore, purportedly both 
true. If two judgments are opposed, the truth of each one implies the falsity 
of the other, so they cannot both be true.2 The “contradiction of reason 
with itself” consists of the claim of truth of both opposed judgments. To 
solve this contradiction, Kant demonstrates that (1) theses and antitheses 
are not both true (in the mathematical antinomies), or that they may both 
be true, but they are not opposed to each other (in the dynamical ones), 
and that (2) the proofs of false theses and antitheses are wrong. Kant 
constructs both parts of this solution on the analysis of the relationship 
between theses and antitheses. If it were not correct, the solution of the 
antinomies would be wrong, it would not allow one to avoid skepticism, 
1 The Critique of Pure Reason is quoted with the abbreviation ‘KrV’ and the page 
number of the fi rst edition (‘A’) and the second edition (‘B’). The other writings by Kant 
are quoted with the abbreviation of the title, followed by the volume, eventually sub-
volume, and page number of the Academy Edition. Quotations from the Pro legomena, 
the Critique of the Power of Judgement and the Jäsche-Logik also indicate the paragraph 
number. Quotations from the Refl exionen also indicate each Refl exion’s number and 
the dating established by Adickes. Quotations from the ‘transcripts’ of Kant’s lectures 
also indicate the dating of the lecture (not the dating of the transcript itself, which may 
have been many years later). For a list of the abbreviations and English translations 
used see below, 529–30. Every translation used reports the pagination of the German 
edition on the border of the page. So, the quotations do not report the page number of 
the translations.
2 See L. Blomberg (beginning of the 1770s), xxiv.1:282. Kant denies that subcontrary 
judgments are opposite in a proper sense, because they can both be simultaneously true: 
see, e.g., L. Pölitz (beginning of the 1780s), xxiv.2:584; Warschauer L. (beginning of the 
1780s), 633; L. Dohna (end of the 1780s or later), xxiv.2:770.
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and it would fail indirectly to prove transcendental idealism and accept 
its ‘Copernican revolution’.
Given the importance of this analysis, it is surprising that the Critique 
of Pure Reason and the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, published 
only two years after the Critique, contain very different accounts of the 
relation between theses and antitheses of the mathematical antinomies. 
According to the fi rst Critique, the theses of the fi rst two antinomies are 
composed of affi rmative judgments of the form ‘A is B’. The antitheses 
are composed of infi nite judgments of the form ‘A is non-B’. These judg-
ments are contradictorily opposed only if a certain condition takes place. 
If this condition actually takes place, the theses and the antitheses are 
true and demonstrable, and the mathematical antinomies arise. Given 
transcendental idealism, this condition does not take place, the theses as 
well as the antitheses are false, and the antinomies do not arise.3 Accord-
ing to the Prolegomena, at least at fi rst sight, the theses are composed of 
affi rmative judgments of the form ‘A is B’. The antitheses are composed 
not of infi nite, but of negative judgments of the form ‘A is not B’. Given 
transcendental idealism, the concept of the subject common to both judg-
ments is inconsistent. Therefore, by the rule ‘non entis nulla sunt praedi-
cata’, both judgments are false.4
These two accounts seem to ascribe two mutually irreducible logical 
forms to the mathematical antinomies, in particular to the antitheses. 
They allege two different reasons for the falsity of the theses and the 
antitheses, and they solve the antinomies with two different arguments. 
It is not at all evident if and how these two treatments can be seen as two 
different explanations of the same error, or if they can somehow be recon-
ciled with each other. What is the logical form of the judgments opposed 
in the mathematical antinomies? Are they opposed by contradiction, as 
the Prolegomena suggest, or by another type of opposition, which the fi rst 
Critique describes? Are the antitheses negative or infi nite judgments? Do 
the Critique and the Prolegomena provide two distinct solutions of the 
mathematical antinomies, or do they provide two different versions of 
the same argument?
This enquiry purports to show that the confl ict between the two ac-
counts of the relationship of theses and antitheses in the Critique of Pure 
Reason and in the Prolegomena is only apparent. The idea of the existence 
of such a confl ict depends on a misinterpretation of paragraphs 52b–52c 
of the Prolegomena. This interpretation is misled by the matching of a 
poorly chosen example and a very concise explanation of the relationship 
between the theses and the antitheses in the exposition of the Prolegomena. 
A different interpretation of the Prolegomena avoids the confl ict with the 
fi rst Critique and renders the two accounts of the mathematical antinomies 
consistent with each other.5
3 See KrV, A 502–27/B 530–55.
4 See Prol., iv:341–42.
5 Ristitsch [1910], Llewelyn [1964], 173–4, and Lee [1989] already noted this prob-
lem. The fi rst and the third author adhered to the interpretation of the Prolegomena 
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The discussion of this problem consists of fi ve parts. The fi rst part 
recalls the formulas of the opposed judgments and the argumentative 
structure of their proofs. The second part shows that the analysis of the 
relation between the theses and the antitheses plays a central role in the 
treatment of the mathematical antinomies in the fi rst Critique. The third 
part expounds upon the analysis of the relation between the theses and the 
antitheses and the solution of the mathematical antinomies which can be 
found in the Prolegomena. The fourth part shows that, on the most natural 
reading of the Prolegomena, the analysis of the relationship between the 
theses and the antitheses in the Critique is incompatible with the one of 
the Prolegomena, and rejects an evolutive explanation of this contrast. 
The fi fth part shows that the most natural reading of the Prolegomena’s 
text rests on weak textual basis, it argues for another interpretation, and 
it shows that this interpretation renders the accounts of the Critique 
and of the Prolegomena consistent which each other. On the contrary of 
what prima facie seems, they do not outline two different solutions of the 
mathematical antinomies, but one and the same solution.
1. Some Preliminary Information
These statements oppose each other in the mathematical antinomies:6
First antinomy:
[1T1] The world has a beginning [1A1] The world has existed
 in time.     eternally.
[1T2] The world has limits in space. [1A2] The world does not
      have limits in space.
Second antinomy:
[2T1] Every composite substance [2A1] No composite substan-
 in the world consists   ce in the world con-
  of simple parts.    sists of simple parts.
[2T2] Simple substances exist  [2A2] No simple substance
 in the world.    exists in the world.7
According to Kant, every judgment comprised in the theses ascribes some 
sort of fi nite magnitude to the world, and every judgment comprised in 
upon which I will expound in § 4 and criticize in § 5. Llewelyn proposed an evolutive 
explanation of the change in Kant’s position. For the sake of brevity, I will not comment 
in detail on Llewelyn’s interpretation, as Walsh [1976], 84–5 does. I only note that an 
evolutive account such as Llewelyn’s is not plausible for the reasons mentioned below, 
524. The conciliation of the Critique with the Prolegomena which is proposed below, 
526–9 compared with Llewelyn’s account, presents the advantage of rendering Kant’s 
position coherent.
6 See KrV, A 426–27/B 454–55, A 434–35/B 462–63, A 504–5/B 532–33; Prol., § 51, 
iv:339; Fort., xxiv:288–89.
7 Kant affi rms that the judgments which construct the theses and the antitheses 
of the fi rst antinomy are opposed to each other. The whole formula of 2T2 and 2A2 is 
respectively: ‘simple substances and composite substances exist in the world’; ‘simple 
substances do not exist in the world, but only composite substances’. 2T1, 2T2, 2A1 and 
2A2, as well as their proofs, share the presupposition that some composite substances 
 A. Vanzo, Kant’s Treatment of the Mathematical Antinomies 509
the antitheses ascribes an infi nite magnitude to the world. The theses and 
the antitheses can be reformulated as judgments of the form ‘x is fi nite’ 
or ‘x is infi nite’:
[1T1] The world is fi nite with regard to time [gone by since its ori-
gin].
[1A1] The world is infi nite with regard to time [gone by since its ori-
gin].
[1T2] The world is fi nite with regard to its extension.
[1A2] The world is infi nite with regard to its extension.
[2T1] Every composite substance in the world is fi nite with regard to
 the decomposition of its parts.
[2A1] Every composite substance in the world is infi nite with regard
 to the decomposition of its parts.8
Only 2T2 and 2A2 cannot be formulated in this way. When Kant intro-
duces the solution of the mathematical antinomies in the seventh section 
of the antinomies chapter of the fi rst Critique, it is not accidental that 
he leaves out 2T2 and 2A2.9 They are a particular couple of judgments 
compared to the other judgments which are opposed in the mathematical 
antinomies.10 For the sake of brevity, in the exposition of the solution of 
the mathematical antinomies I will not discuss the peculiarities due to 
the form of 2T2 and 2A2.
Human reason is naturally inclined to hold:
1) that 1T1 and 1A1, 1T2 and 1A2, 2T1 and 2A1, 2T2 and 2A2 are op-
posed to each other in the technical sense of this expression: they 
cannot both be true at the same time and from the same point of 
view;
2) that they are contradictorily opposed, i.e., that they cannot both be 
false at the same time and from the same point of view.11 Two contra-
dictory judgments are determinately one true and the other false.
exist (see KrV, A 434–36/B 462–64). The second part of 2T2 (‘and composite substances’) 
and the second part of 2A2 (‘but only composite substances’) are not part of the opposi-
tion. Thus, they are omitted from the formulas given above.
8 See KrV, A 504–6/B 532–34. 2T1 and 2A1 mean: the division of composite substances 
in the world must stop after a fi nite series of steps, or it can go on endlessly. To be sure, 
in A 505/B 533 Kant formulates 2T1 and 2A1 differently, writing that “the quantity of 
parts in a given appearance is in itself neither fi nite nor infi nite”. This version of 2T1 
and 2A1 implies that a phenomenal object cannot be constituted by an infi nite quantity 
of simple parts. This seems to be false, and Kant does not argue for it. A 523–27/B 551–55 
and the other formulations of 2T1 and 2A1, anyway, make clear that these sentences 
are not concerned with the question, if the quantity of the parts of every phenomenal 
object is fi nite or infi nite, but with the question, if phenomenal objects have or do not 
have simple parts, no matter if in a fi nite or infi nite quantity.
9 See ibid.
10 2T2 is a mere corollary of 2T1. 2A2 is explained and proven through concepts and 
assumptions which are typical of transcendental idealism (see, e.g., Guyer [1987], 410; 
Kreimendahl [1998], 432; Malzkorn [1999], 186–7).
11 See KrV, A 501/B 529. Man naturally adheres to transcendental realism. Kant 
holds that, if transcendental realism is true, the proofs of the opposed judgments are 
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The truth of the second supposition is necessary for the correctness of the 
proofs of the opposed judgments. The proofs of 1T1, 1A1, 1T2, 1A2, 2A1 
and 2A2 are delineated in these steps:
1) they assume the judgment opposed to the demonstrandum as true;
2) they derive a contradiction from this assumption;
3) they infer the falsity of the judgment opposed to the demonstrandum 
from this contradiction, by reductio ad absurdum;
4) they infer the truth of the demonstrandum from the alternative that 
either the demonstrandum or its opposed judgment must be true and 
from the falsity of the latter.
The proof of 2T1 follows the same fi rst two steps. Then it goes on as fol-
lows:
3) from the contradiction derived at step 2 it infers, by a reductio ad 
absurdum, that either the judgment opposite to the demonstrandum 
(2A1) or another judgment p, whose truth is presupposed by the 
argument at step 2, is false;
4) it proves that a false judgment follows from non-p;
5) it infers the falsity of 2A1 from the alternative stated at step 3 and 
the falsity of non-p;
6) it infers the truth of the demonstrandum from the alternative that 
either the demonstrandum or its opposed judgment must be true 
and from the falsity of the latter.12
The last step (respectively numbers 4 and 6) is correct only if the assump-
tion refuted in the fi rst part of the proof is the contradictory opposite of 
the demonstrandum.13 Otherwise, it is not possible to infer the truth of 
the demonstrandum from the falsity of the refuted assumption, and the 
proofs are wrong.
2. The Analysis and the Solution of the Mathematical Antino-
mies in the First Critique
The analysis of the relationship between theses and antitheses plays a 
decisive role in the treatment of the mathematical antinomies in the fi rst 
valid (see Malzkorn [1999], 115–8). The proofs are correct only if the judgments are 
contradictorily opposed (Malzkorn does not agree with this). So, man is naturally inclined 
to hold that the judgments are opposed by contradiction.
12 See KrV, A 426–43/B 454–71. For a formal exposition, see Malzkorn [1999], 121–90. 
The proof of 2T2 is direct, but this analysis leaves out the peculiarities of 2T2 and 2A2. 
The proposition p, which is a premise of the proof of 2T1, is: ‘it is possible to remove 
all composition in thought’. Kant outlines a more complicate proof for 2T1 than for the 
other propositions in order to make sure that it is 2A1, and not p, which is false.
13 Kant proves 2T1 by refuting 2A1, which is formally opposed to 2T1 by contrariety, 
not by contradiction. The structure of the proof seems to exclude the possibility that 
some substances are divisible into simple parts and others are endlessly divisible. If it 
is thus, 2T1 and 2A1 are determinately one true and the other false, as actual contra-
dictory judgments are.
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Critique. The solution of the mathematical antinomies starts from the 
results of this analysis and presupposes its correctness. Moreover, the 
mathematical antinomies accomplish their anti-skeptical, demonstrative 
and pedagogical function only if the analysis of the relationship between 
the theses and the antitheses is correct.
2.1 The Relationship between the Theses and the Antitheses
The analysis of the relationship between the theses and the antitheses in 
the fi rst Critique aims to leave open the possibility that the opposite judg-
ments are not contradictorily opposed to each other. In the mathematical 
antinomies there is not a traditional contradictory opposition between af-
fi rmative and negative judgments, but an opposition per disparata between 
affi rmative and infi nite judgments. These judgments are determinately the 
one true and the other false only if a certain condition takes place, i.e., if 
the world has a determinate magnitude. Otherwise, they are both false.
Kant introduces the analysis of the relation between the theses and the 
antitheses with some examples. Zeno of Elea claimed that the world “is 
neither in motion not at rest, and it is neither like nor unlike any other 
thing. To those who judged him, it appeared that he wanted entirely to 
deny two mutually contradictory propositions, which is absurd”. As the 
universe is in no place—rather, it comprises every place in itself—it is 
neither in motion from one place to another, nor at rest in the same place. 
Similarly, “if the world-whole (Weltall) includes in itself everything exist-
ing, then it is neither like nor unlike any other thing, because there is no 
other thing outside it, with which it might be compared”. “If someone said 
that a body either smells good or smells not good”, he would be forgetting 
another possibility, “namely that a body has no smell […] at all, and thus 
both confl icting proposition can be false”.14
In each of these examples we can distinguish three mutually disjunc-
tive and conjointly exhaustive possibilities. The fi rst two are expressed 
by the opposed judgments. The third one is expressed by the negation of 
the condition necessary for their truth:
the world is at rest in the same place, it is in movement from a place 
to another one or it is not in any place;
a being x, external to the world and comparable with it, exists and 
the world is like x; a being x, external to the world and comparable 
with it, exists and the world is unlike x; no being which is external 
to the world and comparable with it exists;
the body x smells good, the body x smells not good (bad), the body x 
has no smell at all.
14 A 502–3/B 530–31. Kant formulates the last example with a universal judgment. 
For the sake of simplicity, I have modifi ed the translation of the example to express it 
with a singular judgment. Only oppositions between singular judgments are at stake 
in the mathematical antinomies. Considering oppositions between universal judgments 
as well would require a useless prolongation of the analysis.
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The opposite judgments are determinately one true and the other false 
only if the third possibility does not take place. Otherwise, they are both 
false.
Kant distinguishes this type of opposition from the traditional contra-
dictory opposition between two subject-predicate judgments, for instance 
‘the body x smells good’ and ‘the body x does not smell good’. In this case 
the two opposite judgments cover the whole range of possibilities. This 
is because the second judgment is the mere negation of the fi rst one. It 
only asserts that the state of affairs which the fi rst judgment describes 
does not take place. For instance, ‘the body x does not smell good’ is true 
if x smells bad as well as if x does not have any smell at all. Therefore, 
if one of these two judgments is false, the other is true. Instead, “in the 
previous opposition (per disparata)” between ‘the body x smells good’ 
and ‘the body x smells not good’, the second judgment was not a mere 
negation of the fi rst. “The contingent condition of the concept of body (of 
smell) remained in the case of the confl icting judgment, and thus it was 
not ruled out by it; hence the latter judgment was not the contradictory 
opposite of the former”.15
In the mathematical antinomies there is no traditional contradictory 
opposition, but an opposition per disparata. Kant explains this in detail 
with reference to the relationship between 1T2 and 1A2:
if I say that as regards space either the world is infi nite or it is not infi nite 
(non est infi nitus), then if the fi rst proposition is false, its contradictory op-
posite, “the world is not infi nite”, must be true. […] But if it is said that the 
world is either infi nite or fi nite (non-infi nite), then both propositions could 
be false. For then I regard the world as determined in itself regarding its 
magnitude, since in the opposition I not only rule out its infi nitude, and with 
it, the whole separate existence of the world, but I also add a determination 
to the world, as a thing existing in itself, which might likewise be false, if, 
namely, the world were not given at all as a thing in itself, and hence, as 
regards its magnitude, neither as infi nite nor as fi nite.16
With regard to the magnitude of the world, one can distinguish three 
possibilities. The world is “determined in itself regarding its magnitude”, 
i.e., it has a determinate magnitude, or it is indeterminate regarding its 
magnitude. If the world has a determinate magnitude, this magnitude is 
fi nite, that is, it can be expressed with a number, or it is infi nite, that is, 
“greater than any number”.17 If the world is indeterminate regarding its 
magnitude, it has neither a fi nite nor an infi nite magnitude. The judgments 
1T2 (‘the world is fi nite with regard to its extension’) and 1A2 (‘the world 
is infi nite with regard to its extension’) are determinately one true and 
15 KrV, A 503/B 532 (translation modifi ed); see M. Mrongovius (1782–83), xxix. 
1,2:809.
16 KrV, A 504–5/B 532–33 (translation modifi ed).
17 KrV, A 432/B 460. According to Kant, this concept of actual infi nity is legitimate 
only for those who accept transcendental realism. Transcendental idealism admits only 
potential infi nite. On the relationship between these two concepts of infi nite in the 
antinomies, see Falkenburg [2000], 164–72, 218–27, 249–54.
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the other false only if the world has a determinate magnitude. Otherwise, 
they are both false. Thus, 1T2 and 1A2 are opposed per disparata, like 
‘the body x smells good’ and ‘the body x smells not good’.
How should 1T2 and 1A2 be formulated to build a traditional contra-
dictory opposition, in which each judgment is the mere negation of the 
other? Instead of 1A2 (‘the world is infi nite as regards space’ (Die Welt ist 
dem Raume nach unendlich)) should be 1A2*: ‘the world is not fi nite as 
regards space’ (Die Welt ist dem Raume nach nicht endlich), or, in the place 
of 1T2 (‘the world is fi nite as regards space’ (Die Welt ist dem Raume nach 
endlich)) should be 1T2*: ‘the world is not infi nite as regards space’ (Die 
Welt ist dem Raume nach nicht unendlich). The difference between 1A2 
and 1A2* is subtle, but it is important not to confuse the opposition per 
disparata, which occurs in the antinomies, with the traditional contradic-
tory opposition. Let us try to clarify it a little more.
1A2 and 1A2* have different truth-conditions. If 1T2 is false, 1A2* is 
certainly true and it can be inferred from the falsity of 1T2. 1A2 is true 
only if 1T2 is false and the world has a determinate magnitude.
1A2 and 1A2* have different logical forms as well. 1A2* is a negative 
judgment, because its copula is accompanied by a negative particle. 1A2 is 
an affi rmative judgment, because its copula is not accompanied by a nega-
tive particle. In 1A2 the predicate ‘unendlich’ is composed of the negative 
prefi x ‘un-’ and the adjective ‘endlich’. The particle ‘un-’ does not refer to 
the copula ‘ist’, but to the adjective ‘endlich’. It contributes to determine 
the meaning or ‘content’ of the predicate and of the judgment by express-
ing a negation or privation. Logic “abstracts from all content of cognition” 
and “concerns itself merely with the form of thinking […] in general”.18 
The fact that the predicate contains or does not contain a negation is not 
relevant to the logical form of a judgment. Kant calls ‘infi nite’ an affi rma-
tive judgment whose predicate is accompanied by the negation. 1A2 is an 
infi nite judgment, whereas 1A2* is a negative judgment.
The linguistic or superfi cial form of 1A2 and that of 1A2* are very 
similar. ‘Nicht endlich’ is synonymous of ‘unendlich’. So, 1A2 can be para-
phrased in this way: ‘die Welt ist dem Raume nach nicht endlich’. 1A2* 
and the paraphrase of 1A2 are perfectly identical, even if the former is a 
negative judgment and the latter is an infi nite one.
The similarity between the superfi cial form of 1A2 and 1A2* makes it 
easy to mistake the opposition per disparata between 1T2 and 1A2 with 
a traditional contradictory opposition between an affi rmative judgment 
and a negative one. If the world has a determinate magnitude, this error 
has no consequences. If the world does not have a determinate magnitude, 
this error may let us incorrectly infer 1T2 from the falsity of 1A2 and 1A2 
from the falsity of 1T2. In this case the opposition between 1T2 and 1A2 
is called ‘dialectical opposition’, because it deceptively seems, but it is not, 
a genuine opposition between contradictory judgments.
The distinction between negative and infi nite judgments, the tra-
ditional contradictory opposition, the opposition per disparata and the 
18 KrV, A 131/B 170; see KrV, A 54/B 78.
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dialectical opposition is essential for a correct analysis of the relationship 
between the theses and the antitheses of the mathematical antinomies. 
All judgments opposed in the mathematical antinomies can be formulated 
as affi rmative judgments of the form ‘x is fi nite’ and infi nite judgments 
of the form ‘x is infi nite’.19 The relationship between the theses and the 
antitheses of the mathematical antinomies is identical to the relationship 
between 1T2 and 1A2, so it is easy to take it for a traditional contradictory 
opposition. If one does not distinguish negative and infi nite judgments, 
the traditional contradictory opposition and the opposition per disparata, 
one cannot acknowledge that both theses and antitheses may be false. The 
solution of the mathematical antinomies proves that it is this possibility 
which actually takes place.
2.2 The Solution of the Mathematical Antinomies
The solution of the mathematical antinomies in the Critique of Pure Rea-
son begins with the results of the analysis of the relationship between the 
theses and the antitheses and it presupposes its correctness. The analysis 
established that, if the world does not have a determinate magnitude, the 
theses and the antitheses are false and they are not contradictorily op-
posed to each other. The solution of the mathematical antinomies proves 
that the world does not have a determinate magnitude with a two-part 
argument:
1) the world has a determinate magnitude only if it is a thing in itself. 
Given transcendental realism, the world is a thing in itself and it has 
a determinate magnitude. So, it is fi nite or infi nite as regards to its 
extension in space, its origin in time and to the quantity of the fi nal 
elements of every substance which is comprised in it. The judgments 
opposed in the mathematical antinomies are determinately one true 
and the other false. We can infer the truth of each one from the falsity 
of the other. The proofs of the opposite judgments make use of this 
rule and are valid. Therefore, we should hold as true the judgments 
which construct the theses as well as those which construct the an-
titheses, even if they are contradictorily opposed to each other. The 
mathematical antinomies arise.
2) The Transcendental Aesthetic has proven the falsity of transcendental 
realism and the truth of transcendental idealism. Given transcenden-
tal idealism, the world is not a thing in itself and it does not have a 
determinate magnitude. From this it follows in the fi rst place that 
the world is not determinately fi nite or infi nite. We cannot infer the 
truth of each judgment which composes a thesis or an antithesis 
from the falsity of its opposite. The proofs of the theses and of the 
antitheses make use of this inference, so they are wrong. The theses 
and the antitheses are not proven. In the second place, from the fact 
that the world does not have a determinate magnitude it follows that 
19 See above, 509.
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it is neither fi nite, nor infi nite. The theses are false as well as the 
antitheses.20
Let us examine the fi rst part of the argument. For an object to exist in itself, 
that is, independently of its being known or knowable, the complete series 
of all conditions that, from various points of view, the object presupposes 
has to subsist or to have occurred. With reference to time, the complete 
series of its previous states should have occurred. With reference to its 
extension, the totality of its parts should exist. With reference to each 
one of those parts, every part in which that part can in turn be divided 
should exist. In other terms, for things in themselves holds the principle 
that, “if the conditioned [das Bedingte] is given, then the whole series of 
all conditions for it is also given”.21
Transcendental realism holds that the objects of our senses exist in 
themselves, independently of our knowledge, and that this knowledge mir-
rors or correctly reproduces ‘things in themselves’ in our representations. 
For the transcendental realist, objects as we know them are identical with 
objects as they are in themselves.
As he identifi es objects of our senses with things in themselves, the 
transcendental realist can formulate this ‘dialectical syllogism’:
if the conditioned is given (i.e., it exists and it can be known), 
then the whole series of all conditions for it is also given (prin-
ciple valid for things in themselves)
the conditioned is given (in experience, by means of sensations; 
but transcendental realists identify objects of sensation and 
things in themselves)
the whole series of its condition, i.e., the world, is also given.22
It follows from the syllogism that, as the objects of the senses—for the 
transcendental realist—can be known as they are in themselves, the world 
as well exists and it can be known as it is in itself.
Completeness is a crucial characteristic of the idea of the world. The 
world is “the absolute totality of the sum total of existing things”, “the 
absolute unity of the series of conditions of appearance”, the “sum total 
of all appearances”.23 This whole should not be understood as a class, of 
which appearances are elements in the sense of modern class theory, but as 
a mereological totality, of which appearances are parts, linked to each other 
by causal, spatial, succession and coexistence relations.24 It is not a totum 
20 See KrV, A 504–5/B 532–33. The proofs of the opposite judgments are wrong even 
because they employ some premises which are true and some concepts which are admis-
sible only if one accepts transcendental realism, but not if one accepts transcendental 
idealism. For the sake of brevity, the present analysis does not consider this point.
21 KrV, A 497/B 525; see KrV, A 307–8/B 364.
22 See KrV, A 497/B 525, A 307/B 364–65.
23 See respectively KrV, A 419/B 447, A 334/B 391, A 506–7/B 534–35 (italics 
mine).
24 See Falkenburg [2000], 197.
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analyticum, that is, a whole whose parts exist and can be thought of only 
in relation to it. It is a totum syntheticum, that is, a whole which results 
from the composition or collection of parts that may exist and be thought 
even separately from it. It exists only if their collection is complete.25
If the world is given as it is in itself and if it is characterized by com-
pleteness, it is completely determined in its greatness. It is determinately 
fi nite or infi nite with regard to the three types of ‘greatness’ which are 
at stake in the mathematical antinomies. It exists from a certain time 
(1T1) or it is infi nite with regards to its origin (1A1). The quantity of its 
parts is fi nite (1T2) or infi nite (1A2). The divisibility of each part stops 
at some simple indivisible component (2T1), whose existence has to be 
acknowledged (2T2), or it goes on infi nitely (2A1) and no simple substance 
exists (2A2).
Given transcendental realism, then, the judgments which construct the 
theses and the antitheses are contradictorily opposed to each other. Their 
proofs are valid, they are proven and therefore true. So the mathematical 
antinomies arise.
The second part of the argument builds upon the results of the previous 
sections of the Critique.26 The Transcendental Aesthetic has proven that 
transcendental idealism should be preferred to transcendental realism. Un-
like transcendental realism, transcendental idealism distinguishes objects 
sharply, as they are in themselves from objects, as we know them. The 
latter “are nothing but appearances, i.e., mere representations, which, as 
they are represented […], have outside our thoughts no existence grounded 
in itself”.27 They do not possess any property which cannot be object of 
experience. On the contrary, things in themselves are totally unknown to 
us.28 Given this distinction between appearances and things in themselves, 
not every rule valid for ones is valid for the others. The major premise of 
the dialectical syllogism is true for things in themselves, not for appear-
ances. The minor premise is true only for appearances, because we cannot 
know any thing in itself. To be true, the major premise has to take the 
subject (‘the conditioned’) as a thing in itself, the minor premise as an 
appearance. The premises take a term in two different meanings. Given 
transcendental idealism, the syllogism is not valid:29 it does not show that 
the world is given as a thing in itself.
The solution of the mathematical antinomies in the Critique of Pure 
Reason rests on the fact that the world is not a thing in itself,30 but, on the 
25 See Allison [1983], 43.
26 Kant recalls the central theses of transcendental idealism right before introducing 
the solution of the mathematical antinomies (see KrV, A 490–97/B 518–25).
27 KrV, A 490–91/B 518–19.
28 See e.g. KrV, A 277–78/B 333–34.
29 This error is called ‘quaternio terminorum’ and ‘sophisma fi gurae dictionis’ (see 
KrV, A 498–501/B 525–29).
30 The thesis that the “sum-total of appearances” is a thing in itself would sound 
quite paradoxical in Kant’s Critical philosophy. The world is a totum syntheticum of 
appearances: it exists only if the appearances which compose it exist. They exist only if 
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contrary, is strictly related to our experience. In the empirical regress in 
time, from an event to its conditions of possibility, and in space, from an 
object to the objects which are external to it, “there can be encountered 
no experience of an absolute boundary, and hence no experience of a con-
dition as one that is absolute unconditioned empirically”.31 “One can […] 
concede that the decomposition” of the space “could never do away with 
all composition”.32 On the other hand, “I cannot say the world is infi nite 
in past time or in space”.33 “It is by no means permitted to say of such 
a whole, which is divisible to infi nity, that it consists of infi nitely many 
parts”.34 This is because we can never have experience of infi nitely many 
objects or events which follow one another in space or in time, nor can we 
“exhibit any infi nite multiplicity or the taking together of this multiplic-
ity into one whole”.35 If the world exists only in our experience and there 
cannot be any experience of a fi nite or (actually) infi nite world, then the 
world is neither fi nite nor infi nite.
So, the mathematical antinomies have a ‘negative solution’. As tran-
scendental realism is false and transcendental idealism is true, the world 
is neither fi nite, nor infi nite. It is indeterminate or indefi nite with regards 
to its extension in space, its origin in time and to the quantity of the fi nal 
elements of every object which is comprised in it. The proofs of the opposite 
judgments are wrong and the theses are false as well as the antitheses.36 
The anti-skeptical, demonstrative and pedagogical functions of the math-
ematical antinomies rely on this ‘negative solution’.
2.3 The Anti-Skeptical, Demonstrative and Pedagogical Functions 
    of the Solution of the Mathematical Antinomies
Kant ascribes an anti-skeptical, a demonstrative and a pedagogical func-
tion to the solution of the mathematical antinomies.37 The anti-skeptical 
function consists of its capacity to avoid reason’s fall into skepticism as 
a consequence of the “contrast of reason with itself”. The demonstrative 
they are linked to some actual experience. Thus, the existence of the world depends on 
experience as well. Things in themselves are completely independent of experience.
31 KrV, A 517/B 545.
32 KrV, A 525/B 553.
33 KrV, A 520/B 548.
34 KrV, A 524/B 552.
35 Ibid.
36 Besides this ‘negative solution’, Kant gives an ‘affi rmative solution’ of the math-
ematical antinomies. This is the explanation of “how the empirical regress is to be 
instituted so as to attain to the complete concept of the object” (KrV, A 510/B 538; see 
A 515–16/B 543–44). No experience can give us that concept. It is the ideal to which we 
have to tend in enlarging and systematizing our empirical knowledge.
37 Kant ascribes these functions to all antinomies, employing ‘antinomy of pure 
reason’ as a collective term. Some interpreters (e.g., Guyer [1987], 406–7) deny that the 
dynamical antinomies provide an indirect proof of transcendental idealism. If this is true, 
only the mathematical antinomies have a demonstrative and a pedagogical function. 
However things may be, this paragraph considers only the mathematical antinomies. 
It also leaves out the systematic role of the antinomies, because only the treatment of 
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function consists of the possibility of reformulating the solution of the 
antinomies as an indirect proof of transcendental idealism. The peda-
gogical function consists of the capacity of this indirect proof to persuade 
man to abandon transcendental realism and adhere to the Critical point 
of view. Let us see how the solution of the fi rst Critique carries out these 
functions.
The antinomies threaten to lead everyone who raises the problems of 
rational cosmology to skepticism. Until one begins a critical inquiry of 
the extension, foundation and limits of human knowledge, one naturally 
adheres to transcendental realism. On the basis of this theory, together 
with assumptions and defi nitions which Kant considers obvious, the 
antinomies arise “naturally” and “unavoidably” in the human mind.38 
Transcendental realists can prove couples of contradictorily opposed judg-
ments with apparently valid arguments from premises which seem true. 
As it is well-known, from a single contradiction it is possible to prove every 
judgment and its negation with correct inferences. Once admitted, as Kant 
does, that consistence is a necessary condition for truth, the existence of 
a real “contradiction of reason with itself” would sanction the incapacity 
of human reason to attain the truth. The antinomies are a privileged way 
to skepticism.
In the face of this danger, man cannot avoid taking sides. His interest 
in science, morals and religion induces him to look with favor sometimes 
to the theses, sometimes to the antitheses. It does not allow him to lose 
interest in the antinomical confl ict, as if it were not an important problem.39 
It only remains for him to embrace skepticism, or to prove that the theses 
and the antitheses are not contradictorily opposed. The solution of the an-
tinomies allows man to choose the second alternative, to rescue the power 
of reason to attain the truth and to avoid falling into skepticism.40
The solution of the antinomies refuses skepticism only by assuming 
the validity of transcendental idealism among its premises. It is not an 
easy assumption to make, because it implies the acceptance of the long 
and complex arguments of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Tran-
scendental Analytic. By reformulating the solution of the antinomies as 
an indirect proof of transcendental idealism, Kant reverses the relation of 
dependence between it and the solution of the antinomies. Transcendental 
idealism is no longer a premise necessary for solving the antinomies. On 
the dynamical antinomies of pure reason, not that of the mathematical ones, is a model 
for the treatment of the antinomies of moral philosophy, aesthetics and teleological 
consideration of living beings.
38 Kant describes this process in detail in KrV, A 408–21/B 435–49. On the natural-
ness and unavoidability of the antinomies see e.g. KrV, A 407/B 433–34, A 441–42/B 
449–50, A 462/B 490.
39 See KrV, A 462–76/B 490–504.
40 In the Critical period, Kant was very hostile to this doctrine (see e.g. KrV, A 758/B 
786 ff.) Many scholars hold the confutation of Humean skepticism to be one of the main 
goals of the Critique of Pure Reason. If so, the importance of the anti-skeptical function 
of the antinomies can hardly be exaggerated.
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the contrary, the solution of the antinomies offers a new proof of tran-
scendental idealism, independent of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the 
Transcendental Analytic.
The indirect proof of transcendental idealism is as follows. Transcen-
dental realism holds that “the world is a whole existing in itself”. Tran-
scendental idealism holds that “appearances in general are nothing outside 
our representations”. Transcendental realism and transcendental idealism 
are two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive theories of the relation-
ship between knowing subjects and known objects.41 Given transcendental 
realism, the world is either fi nite or infi nite, but it is possible to refute both 
these alternatives, “according to the proof offered above for the antithesis 
on the one side and the thesis on the other”. Thus, transcendental realism 
is false and transcendental idealism is true.42
The pedagogical role of this indirect proof of transcendental idealism is 
even more important than its demonstrative function. From a demonstra-
tive point of view, the indirect proof is useful, but it is not necessary. The 
Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic constituted a 
long, direct proof of transcendental idealism, independent of the one pro-
vided by the antinomies.43 The latter proof is indispensable in persuading 
man to accept transcendental idealism only from a pedagogical point of 
view. If transcendental realism is true, man can hope to satisfy his inborn 
desire to know the world, the soul and God. Transcendental idealism de-
nies the possibility of knowing the supersensible. The direct proof of the 
fi rst part of the Critique, even if valid, is not persuasive enough to induce 
man to accept “a principle [transcendental idealism] that so narrows the 
fi eld of its speculation” and “sacrifi ces in which so many otherwise shin-
ing hopes must entirely disappear”.44 The indirect proof derived from the 
antinomies is more persuasive, because “a contradiction always carries 
with it more clarity of representation than the best connection [between 
the premises and the conclusion, exhibited by direct proofs], and thereby 
more closely approaches the intuitiveness of a demonstration”.45 Only by 
refl ecting on the “confl ict of reason with itself” man can resign himself 
to abandon transcendental realism and accept the Copernican revolution 
of Critical philosophy.46
41 See Allison [1983], 14 ff. For a critic, see Malzkorn [1999], 103, n. 45 and 112–3.
42 KrV, A 506–7/B 535–36. Sometimes Kant describes this proof as an ‘experiment 
of pure reason’, similar to those which are carried out in natural science (see KrV, B 
xx–xxi, text and note; Fort., xx:290–91).
43 From a demonstrative point of view, direct proofs should be preferred to indirect 
proofs (see KrV, A 789/B 817). It follows that the argument exposed in the fi rst part of 
the Critique is to be preferred to the argument drawn from the antinomies.
44 KU, § 57, Anm. II, v:344.
45 KrV, A 790/B 818.
46 Kant emphasizes the pedagogical importance of the discovery of the antinomies 
no less than the importance of their solution: see e.g. KpV, v:107–8; KU, § 57, Anm. 
II, v:344–45.
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The anti-skeptical, demonstrative and pedagogical functions of the 
antinomies allow human reason to go through a necessary path from the 
deceptive appearance of transcendental realism, through the refl ection on 
the cosmological problems, the awakening from the “dogmatic slumber”, 
the experience of the “confl ict of reason with itself” and the threat of 
skepticism, to the acceptance of transcendental idealism.47
Obviously, though, the solution of the mathematical antinomies can 
carry out these functions only if it is correct. Its correctness in turn de-
pends on the correctness of the analysis of the relationship between the 
opposite judgments. If the theses and the antitheses were not composed of 
affi rmative and infi nite judgments, which are contradictorily opposed only 
on a certain condition, but affi rmative and negative judgments, it would 
not be possible to deny both of them and assign the truth to a third alter-
native.48 It would not be possible to avoid skepticism, to prove indirectly 
transcendental idealism and to transform this proof into a pedagogical 
instrument for reason reluctant to abandon realism. Thus, the analysis 
of the relationship between the theses and the antitheses is indispensable 
not only for the solution of the mathematical antinomies, but for their 
anti-skeptical, demonstrative and pedagogical functions as well.
3. The Solution of the Mathematical Antinomies 
in the Prolegomena
The treatment of the mathematical antinomies in the Prolegomena is 
much shorter than the treatment of the Critique of Pure Reason. After 
having introduced the theses and antitheses roughly in the same terms 
of the Critique, Kant explains the relationship between them by starting 
with an example. Then he explains why the theses are false as well as the 
antitheses: “of two mutually contradictory propositions both cannot be 
false except if the concept underlying them both is itself contradictory; e.g., 
the two propositions: a rectangular circle is round, and: a rectangular circle 
is not round, are both false”.49 In this case a rule holds true which Kant 
recalls in the Doctrine of Method of the fi rst Critique: “non entis nulla 
sunt praedicata, i.e., both what one asserts affi rmatively as well as what 
one asserts negatively of the object are incorrect”.50 “Underlying the fi rst 
two antinomies […] is a contradictory concept of this type”.51 The subject 
of the opposite judgments is the inconsistent concept of “a sensible world 
existing for itself”. Thus, the theses are false as well as the antitheses.
Why should one understand the term ‘world’ in the theses and in the 
antitheses as ‘a sensible world existing in itself’? Why is this concept 
inconsistent?
47 See KrV, A 761/B 789.
48 On the importance of the infi nite judgment in the antinomies, see Ishikawa 
[1990].
49 Prol., § 52b, iv:341 (italics mine).
50 KrV, A 793/B 821.
51 Prol., § 52c, iv:341.
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According to transcendental idealism, objects in space and time are not 
things in themselves, but appearances. “I must not say of that which I think 
in space or time: that it is in itself in space and time, independent of this 
thought of mine”.52 If what I think in space and time existed in itself as I 
represent it to myself, independently of its being represented, space and 
time would exist independently of my representations as well. According to 
transcendental idealism, “space and time […] are nothing existing outside 
my representations, but are themselves only modes of representation”. 
“It is patently contradictory to say of a mere mode of representation that 
it also exists outside our representation”.53 As a consequence, it is false 
that objects in space and time exist in themselves.
Once this premise has been established, the argument goes as fol-
lows:
1) If the world is fi nite or infi nite, it is a thing in itself. “It is not pos-
sible to have experience of either an infi nite space or infi nitely fl ow-
ing time, or of a bounding of the world by an empty space or by an 
earlier, empty time”.54 So, the world cannot be fi nite or infi nite as 
an object of experience. It must be fi nite of infi nite in itself, that is, 
independently of the possibility of having experience of its fi niteness 
or infi niteness. In this case, the sensible world is a thing in itself.
2) “But this contradicts the concept of a sensible world, which is simply 
a sum total of the appearances whose existence and connection takes 
place only in representation, namely in experience, since the world is 
not a thing in itself, but is itself nothing but a mode of representation 
(Vor stellungsart)”.55 If the world had a fi nite or infi nite magnitude, it 
would be “a sensible world existing for itself”, an object of experience 
existing before and independently of any experience. This concept of 
‘world’ is inconsistent.
3) The opposite judgments ascribe fi niteness or infi niteness to the world. 
So, they adopt this inconsistent concept of ‘world’. As non entis nulla 
sunt praedicata, they are false.
It is possible to apply this argument to the division of appearances in 
parts as well.56 In this way one can prove that the theses as well as the 
antitheses of both mathematical antinomies are false. “The falsity of the 
presupposition” common to the theses and to the antitheses, concludes 
Kant, “consisted in the following: that something self-contradictory (na-
mely, appearance as thing in itself) would be represented as being unifi able 
in a concept”.57
The Prolegomena also expound upon various ideas which Kant had 
already explained in the discussion of the mathematical antinomies in 
52 Ibid.
53 Prol., § 52c, iv:341–42.
54 Prol., § 52c, iv:342.
55 Ibid.
56 See Prol., § 52c, iv:342.
57 Prol., § 53, iv:343.
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the fi rst Critique. It is transcendental realism, with its identifi cation of 
appearances and things in themselves, which leads man to ascribe fi nite-
ness or infi niteness to the sensible world, even if these may only belong to 
the world in itself.58 Once transcendental realism has been accepted, the 
antinomies arise naturally and unavoidably.59 In every antinomy “both 
thesis and antithesis can be established through equally evident, clear, 
and incontestable proofs”.60 The “confl ict of reason with itself” makes 
the skeptic rejoice61 and it obliges human reason, as well as the attentive 
reader of the Prolegomena, to awake from the dogmatic slumber and 
undertake a critical examination of pure reason.62 The Prolegomena em-
phasize this pedagogical function of the discovery of the antinomies more 
than the pedagogical function of their solution, that is, persuading man 
to endorse transcendental idealism. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that 
Kant considers the antinomies a privileged way to Critical philosophy in 
the Prolegomena as well.63
Other parts of the treatment of the mathematical antinomies in the 
Critique are absent in the Prolegomena. Here Kant expounds upon neither 
the proofs, nor the confutations of the opposed judgments, and he does 
not comment in detail on the solution of each mathematical antinomy. 
The solution of the antinomies in the Prolegomena makes clear why the 
theses and the antitheses are false, but it does not explain why their 
proofs are wrong. The Prolegomena do not report the indirect proof of 
transcendental idealism, which the fi rst Critique draws from the solution 
of the antinomies. The introductory remarks to which Kant devoted no 
less than three paragraphs in the Critique are also absent in the work of 
1783.64 What is of greater relevance, however, is that which seems to be a 
radical divergence in the analysis of the relation between the theses and 
the antitheses.
4. A Divergence between the First Critique 
and the Prolegomena?
According to the most natural reading of the Prolegomena, their analysis 
of the relationship between the theses and the antitheses is incompatible 
with the one of the Critique of Pure Reason. The Prolegomena seem to 
maintain that the judgments which construct the theses and the antith-
eses are opposed to each other like ‘a rectangular circle is round’ and ‘a 
rectangular circle is not round’, that is, as an affi rmative and a negative 
judgment with the same subject, the same predicate and an affi rmative 
58 See Prol., § 52a, iv:339–40.
59 See Prol., § 51, iv:339.
60 See Prol., § 52a, iv:340; Prol., § 52b, n., iv:341.
61 See Prol., § 52a, iv:340.
62 See Prol., § 50, iv:338; Prol., § 52b, n., iv:341; Prol., § 54, iv:347–48.
63 See Prol., iv:379–80.
64 KrV, A 462–90/B 490–518.
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or negative copula (‘A is B’—‘A is not B’). The theses and the antitheses 
have the typical form of contradictorily opposed judgments, but the incon-
sistence of the concept of their subjects makes both judgments false and 
allows no real contradictory opposition to hold.65 The Critique maintains 
that the judgments which construct the theses and the antitheses are op-
posed as ‘the body x smells good’ and ‘the body x smells not good’. They 
are not affi rmative and negative judgments with the same subject, the 
same predicate and an affi rmative or negative copula, but an affi rmative 
and an infi nite judgment with the same subject, an affi rmative copula and 
different predicates, the fi rst affi rmative, the second negative (‘A is B’—‘A 
is non-B’). As a consequence, the opposition between the judgments which 
construct the theses and those which construct the antitheses is not a 
traditional contradictory opposition, but an opposition per disparata.
This is not a merely formal divergence. In the fi rst Critique the correct-
ness of the solution of the mathematical antinomies and of the indirect 
proof of transcendental idealism, as well as the anti-skeptical, demonstra-
tive and pedagogical functions of this solution depend on the holding of 
an opposition per disparata between affi rmative and infi nite judgments. 
The Prolegomena seem to set forth a different analysis of their relation-
ship. They abandon, at least apparently, the solution of the fi rst Critique. 
They appeal to a different logical law and they present a new argument 
to establish the falsity of the theses and the antitheses.
Do both treatments of the mathematical antinomies really expound 
upon two different proofs, or is it possible to interpret them as two dif-
ferent versions of the same proof and to reconcile the differences between 
the Critique and the Prolegomena? In the fi rst case, these questions have 
to be answered: which analysis of the opposite judgments is correct? Once 
the presuppositions of Kant’s arguments are accepted as true, are both 
proofs valid? Can both proofs fulfi ll an anti-skeptical, demonstrative and 
pedagogical function? Why do the Prolegomena abandon the account of 
the fi rst Critique? In the second case, an interpretation of the text of the 
Prolegomena which allows its reconciliation with the account of the fi rst 
Critique should be given.
The hypothesis of evolution in Kant’s position on the structure and so-
lution of the mathematical antinomies is not convincing.66 Kant published 
65 In the Prolegomena, Kant calls ‘a rectangular circle is round’ and ‘a rectangular 
circle is not round’ “two contradictory propositions”, at the basis of which a contradictory 
concept lies (Prol., § 52b, iv:341). If these judgments are both false, and if contradictory 
judgments are determinately one true and the other false, they are not contradictory 
judgments in strict sense. As the judgments opposed per disparata, the judgments in 
the example “collapse, because the condition collapses under which alone either of them 
would be valid” (KrV, A 503/B 531; italics mine). The condition at stake is the internal 
consistence of the subject concept.
66 An evolutive explanation has been proposed, with more plausibility, for another 
contradiction in the discussion of the antinomies in the fi rst Critique: that between the 
solution of the dynamical antinomies announced in A 505–6/B 533–34 and the solution 
expounded upon in A 532–65/B 560–93 (see Adickes [1889], 426, n. 1; Kemp Smith 
[1918], 506, 511–2).
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the Prolegomena in 1783, two years after the Critique of Pure Reason. The 
Prolegomena and the writings which were not destined to publication—let-
ters, Refl exionen, notes to the fi rst edition of the Critique—do not offer 
any proof that, at that time, Kant became dissatisfi ed with the treatment 
of the mathematical antinomies of 1781, and that he looked for another 
one. On the contrary, the chapter on the antinomies in the 1787 edition 
of the Critique does not present any relevant variation in regard to the 
fi rst edition.67 Kant did not take pains to modify it to render it compatible 
with the treatment of the Prolegomena. In the second edition he published 
other unchanged pages which were no more compatible with its position of 
1787, as those devoted to moral philosophy in the Canon of Pure Reason, 
which the Groundwork of 1785 and the Critique of Practical Reason of 
1788 rendered out-of-date. Could he have changed his mind with regard 
to the solution of the mathematical antinomies as well, without updating 
the text of the fi rst Critique? This does not seem to be the case. Since Kant 
devoted autonomous works to moral philosophy from 1785 on, the Canon 
of Pure Reason lost most of its importance.68 This explains why Kant did 
not care to revise it in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. 
Differently from the Canon, the antinomies still had a fundamental role 
in the Critical philosophy in 1787, as well as the transcendental deduction 
and the paralogisms.69 As Kant, unsatisfi ed with the fi rst redaction of these 
two chapters, rewrote them entirely for the 1787 edition, he would have 
rewritten the mathematical antinomies as well, if had no longer accepted 
the solution of 1781.
Upon exclusion of an ‘evolutive’ explanation of Kant’s position, one 
can only declare the incompatibility of Kant’s 1781 and 1783 texts,70 or 
look for an interpretation of the Prolegomena which removes the contra-
diction to the fi rst Critique. In the following paragraph, I will sketch the 
second alternative.
5. A Different Interpretation of the Treatment of the Mathemat-
ical Antinomies in the Prolegomena
Contrary to the fi rst glance, the interpretation of the relationship between 
the theses and the antitheses in the Prolegomena which has been exposed 
rests on weak textual basis. No sentence in the Prolegomena explicitly 
states that the antitheses of the mathematical antinomies are negative 
judgments and are opposed to the theses in such a way that, had their 
subject not been inconsistent, there would be an authentic contradictory 
67 One can easily notice the differences between A and B, e.g., in R. Schmidt’s edition 
of the Critique of Pure Reason.
68 On the relationship between the Canon of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practi-
cal Reason see Landucci [1997], v–xii.
69 Kant recalls the importance of the antinomies of 1781, together with those of the 
practical reason and of the aesthetic power of judgment, in KpV, v:107–8 and in KU, § 
57, Anm. II, v:243.
70 Ristitsch [1910], 493 does so.
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opposition. With reference to the mathematical antinomies, the text reads: 
“now underlying the fi rst two antinomies, which I call mathematical […], 
is a contradictory concept of this type; and by this means I explain how 
it happens that thesis and antithesis are both false together”. “If I ask 
about the magnitude of the world with respect to space and time, for all 
of my concepts it is equally impossible to assert that it is fi nite as that it 
is infi nite. […] since the concept of a sensible world existing for itself is, in 
itself, contradictory, any solution to this problem as to its magnitude will 
always be false, whether one attempts to solve it affi rmatively or nega-
tively”.71 The only expression which may refer to a contradictory opposition 
is the contraposition of an ‘affi rmative attempt’ and a ‘negative attempt’ 
to solve the antinomies in the last sentence, but these are not technical 
expressions. ‘Negative attempt’ may refer to a negative judgment as well 
as to an infi nite judgment, because both contain a ‘negative’ element as 
a part of the copula or of the predicate.
Which element of the text gives the reader the impression that Kant 
in the Prolegomena considers the opposite judgments an affi rmative and 
a negative judgment of the form ‘A is B’ and ‘A is not B’? This depends on 
the fact that the explication of the relationship between the theses and the 
antitheses immediately follows the example of the opposition between ‘a 
circle is round’ and ‘a circle is not round’. The judgments in the example 
are really an affi rmative and a negative judgment with the same subject, 
the same predicate and an affi rmative or negative copula. Kant himself 
stresses that they are “two mutually contradictory propositions”.72 In the 
last sentence before the explanation of the relationship between the theses 
and the antitheses he explains, with reference to the example: “the logical 
sign for the impossibility of a concept consists, then, in this: that under 
the presupposition of this concept, two contradictory propositions would be 
false simultaneously; and so, since in between these two a third proposi-
tion cannot be thought, through this concept nothing at all is thought”. 
Only in the case of contradictory opposites, not in that of affi rmative and 
infi nite judgments which are opposed per disparata, there is not any third 
possibility beside those described by the two judgments. So, if their subject 
were not inconsistent, the judgments in the example would actually be 
contradictorily opposed judgments.73 Then Kant writes that “underlying 
the fi rst two antinomies […] is a contradictory concept of this type”.
This move from the example to the explanation of the relation between 
the theses and the antitheses suggests the reader to apply the type of op-
position holding between the judgments in the example to the judgments 
opposed in the mathematical antinomies. An affi rmative and a negative 
71 Prol., § 52c, iv:342.
72 For this and the following quotations, see Prol., §§ 52b–52c, iv:341 (my italics).
73 This prevents us from understanding ‘a rectangular circle is not round’ [ein 
viereckichter Cirkel ist nicht rund] as an infi nite rather than a negative judgment, see-
ing in the example an opposition per disparata, and solving the contrast between the 
Critique and the Prolegomena in the simplest way.
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judgment, like ‘a rectangular circle is round’ and ‘a rectangular circle is 
not round’, would oppose to each other in the mathematical antinomies. In 
the continuation of the text Kant explains why the concept of the subject 
common to the theses and the antitheses is internally inconsistent. As 
the judgments in the example are false because their subject is an incon-
sistent concept, so are the theses and the antitheses. The example seems 
to offer a good clue for understanding the structure of the mathematical 
antinomies.
Actually, the text of the Prolegomena only suggests this transposition 
of the logical form of the example to the relation between the theses and 
the antitheses, but it does not contain any unquestionable confi rmation 
that the theses and the antitheses are really opposed as the judgments of 
the example. Kant only affi rms that “underlying the fi rst two antinomies 
[…] is a contradictory concept of this type”. Like the judgments in the 
example, the theses and the antitheses are both false because the concept 
of their subject is inconsistent. Nevertheless, the rule ‘non entis nulla 
sunt praedicata’ does not apply only to couples of opposed or contradic-
tory judgments, but to every single judgment, be it affi rmative, nega-
tive, or infi nite. The theses and the antitheses are both false, even if the 
antitheses are not negative judgments and if they do not have the same 
predicate as the theses. It is enough that the antitheses have an internally 
inconsistent concept as subject, be they affi rmative, negative, or infi nite. 
Kant’s statements are totally valid even if the antitheses do not have the 
form ‘A is not B’.
This allows us to propose a different interpretation. In the Pro lego mena, 
Kant does not decide what relation holds between the opposite judgments. 
He does not deny, nor does he state, that the theses and the antitheses 
are composed by affi rmative and infi nite judgments which are opposed per 
disparata and dialectically. He only explains why the theses are false as 
well as the antitheses, and he does this with an argument which is valid 
whatever form and relation to the theses the antitheses may have. The text 
of the Prolegomena is compatible with the explanation of the relationship 
between the theses and the antitheses of the fi rst Critique.
A passage of the Doctrine of Method of the Critique of Pure Reason, some 
notices for the unfi nished work on the Progress of Metaphysics and some 
Refl exionen confi rm the compatibility of the Critique and the Pro legomena. 
In the Doctrine of Method Kant warns against employing indirect proofs 
in the sciences where one can substitute “that which is subjective in our 
representations for that which is objective, namely the cognition of what 
is in the object”.74 Indirect proofs rely on the contradictory opposition 
between two propositions, but in those sciences it may happen that “both 
propositions contradict each other only under a subjective condition that 
is falsely held to be objective, and that since the condition is false, both of 
them can be false, without it being possible to infer the truth of one from 
the falsehood of the other”.75 In metaphysics, in particular, sometimes
74 KrV, A 791/B 819.
75 KrV, A 792/B 820.
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both, the affi rmative as well as the negative part […], have as their ground 
an impossible concept of the object, and then the rule holds that non entis 
nulla sunt praedicata […], and one cannot arrive at cognition of the truth 
apagogically through the refutation of its opposite. So, for example, if it is 
presupposed that the sensible world is given in its totality in itself, then it is 
false that it must be either infi nite in space or fi nite and bounded […]. For ap-
pearances (as mere representations), which would yet be given in themselves 
(as objects) are something impossible, and the infi nity of this imagined whole 
would, to be sure, be unconditioned, but would nevertheless (since everything 
in appearances is conditioned) contradict the unconditioned determination 
of magnitude that is presupposed in the concept.76
The fi rst citations state that the opposition between the theses and the 
antitheses is a dialectical and not a contradictory one, as the Critique 
highlights. The last one explains that the concept of the subject of the 
theses and antitheses is inconsistent, as the Prolegomena emphasize. Kant 
places the two accounts in a single text, so he takes them to complement 
each other.
In the notices for the unfi nished work on the Progress of Metaphysics 
we can fi nd a similar hint for such an explanation of the apparent confl ict. 
Here Kant maintains, as in the Critique but with different words, that 
in the mathematical antinomies there is not a “logical” or “analytical” 
contradictory opposition, but a “transcendental confl ict of the synthetic 
opposition” between “two judgments which oppose each other as contrar-
ies”, every one of which “says more than what is required for the logical 
opposition”.77 He also explains, as in the Prolegomena, that those who hold 
that the world is fi nite or infi nite think of it as being a noumenal “absolute 
whole”, but this thought is self-contradictory.78 The fi rst statement allows 
him to show that the proofs are wrong. The second one explains the falsity 
of the theses and the antitheses.
Among the Refl exionen, the one published by Adickes as number 
5962 and dated ‘about 1788–91’ suggests the same explanation in a more 
explicit way:
These two propositions [‘the world is infi nite with regard to the space and 
time’ and ‘it is not (given as) infi nite’] can both be false, because each one 
contains more than what is required for the contradiction. This is the logical 
solution of the antinomies. But they are also both false, because they contain 
an impossible condition, i.e., that the world is entirely given in space and in 
time (as well as [that] a compositum is entirely given [reference to the second 
antinomy]), and nevertheless that it is given in space and time. In fact the 
fi rst sentence is grounded on the presupposition that a whole of the appear-
ances is given in itself outside of the representations, which is contradictory. 
And this is the transcendental solution of the antinomy.79
76 KrV, A 792–93/B 820–21.
77 Fort., xx:291.
78 Fort., xx:328.
79 Refl . 5962 (about 1788–91), xviii:401–5, here 404.
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If this interpretation is correct, the solutions of the mathematical antino-
mies of the fi rst Critique and the Prolegomena are compatible with each 
other. The fi rst Critique analyzes the relationship between the theses and 
the antitheses and relies on this analysis to show that their proofs are 
wrong. The Prolegomena leave completely off this proof and justify with 
a new argument the falsity of the theses and the antitheses.
The Prolegomena do not clarify which relationship holds between the 
theses and the antitheses, even if this is a fundamental part of the treat-
ment of the antinomies in the Critique of Pure Reason, because their size 
and aims are much more modest. The Critique presents the mathemati-
cal antinomies in all details, it describes how man comes “naturally” and 
“unavoidably”80 to hold the theses as well as the antitheses to be true, it 
exposes and comments upon their proofs. In order to solve the antinomies, 
it must show that the theses and the antitheses are not both true or that 
they are not contradictorily opposed to each other, and that the proofs of 
the false theses or antitheses are not valid. Showing that the theses and 
the antitheses are not contradictorily opposed is necessary not to show 
that they are both false, but to show that their proofs are not valid.81 As 
they are only a compendium, the Prolegomena present a brief treatment 
of the mathematical antinomies. They explain neither the proofs of the 
theses and of the antitheses, nor the reasons why they are wrong. They 
only prove that the theses are false as well as the antitheses. To prove 
this, it is enough to show that their subject is inconsistent. It is not neces-
sary to establish what kind of logical relation holds between them. Thus, 
there is nothing strange in the fact that the Prolegomena, differing from 
the Critique, do not explain what relation holds between the theses and 
the antitheses.
In the fi rst Critique and in the Prolegomena Kant justifi es the falsity 
of the opposite judgments with two different, but similar and compatible 
arguments. These two assumptions play a central role in both proofs: the 
world exists only in our experience, it is a ‘mode of representation’ and not 
a thing in itself; it is not possible to have experience of the fi niteness or 
infi niteness of the world. The fi rst assumption is typical of transcendental 
idealism. It is not accepted by transcendental realists.82 Thus, both proofs 
presuppose the truth of transcendental idealism, which can be proven by 
the indirect proof expounded upon in the Critique. Both proofs rely on 
the impossibility of ascribing properties which cannot be object of any 
80 See above, 518, n. 38.
81 In the fi rst Critique Kant proves that the theses and the antitheses are false with 
the following argument: the world exists only in our experience; there cannot be any 
experience of a fi nite or (actually) infi nite world; therefore, the world is neither fi nite, nor 
infi nite. To set forth this argument it is not necessary to undertake a detailed analysis 
of the form of the theses and the antitheses. It is enough to prove that one cannot have 
experience of a fi nite or an infi nite world.
82 According to the Critique as well as to the Prolegomena, the negation of this as-
sumption, that is, the admission that the sensible world is a thing in itself, is the wrong 
presupposition which determines the rise of the mathematical antinomies.
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experience to a ‘mode of representation’. The Critique makes use of this 
impossibility to hold that a fi nite or infi nite world is not object of possible 
experience, that is, it is not ‘really possible’. The Prolegomena make use of 
it to hold that the concept of a fi nite or infi nite world is not only without 
‘real possibility’, but it is without logical possibility as well, because it is 
internally inconsistent.83 In fact, the Prolegomena follow the rule ‘non entis 
nulla sunt praedicata’, which holds only for the internally inconsistent 
nihil negativum,84 whereas the Critique does not mention this rule. Both 
texts conclude that the opposite judgments are false.
If we accept this interpretation of the solution of the antinomies in 
the Prolegomena, we must acknowledge that the positioning of the rect-
angular circle example right before the relationship between the theses 
and the antitheses is misleading. It gives the wrong impression that the 
Prolegomena ascribe to the antinomies a different relation from the one of 
the fi rst Critique. The example of the rectangular circle may easily deceive 
the reader. If Kant had chosen an affi rmative and an infi nite judgment, 
rather than an affi rmative and a negative one, the text would have been 
clearer. The example of the rectangular circle is not very appropriate 
even for those who maintain that the relation between the theses and 
the antitheses in the Prolegomena is actually that of contradiction. The 
predicate ‘round’ is analytically entailed in the concept ‘circle’, which is 
a part of the subject’s concept, and it is contradictory to another concept 
which composes the subject, ‘non-round’, entailed by ‘rectangular’. In the 
mathematical antinomies the predicates ‘fi nite’ and ‘infi nite’ are neither 
comprised, nor excluded in the subject concept ‘world’. The alternative to 
considering Kant’s example and its positioning in the text inappropriate is 
holding that the Prolegomena contradict the Critique. Ascribing to Kant’s 
text the fi rst limit is surely the lesser of the two evils.
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